The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has released the complete docket on the investigation of the Dominican airline RED AIR accident at Miami City Airport, which occurred on June 21, 2022. The docket’s publication represents one of the final steps before the release of the final accident report.
This information revealed by the NTSB regarding the state of operational safety in Dominican civil aviation is deeply concerning. The interrogations reveal significant issues with the understanding and management of their responsibilities among high-ranking officials of the Dominican Institute of Civil Aviation. Notably, there are evident problems in the certification and oversight processes of national airlines.
These investigations led the Federal Aviation Administration to issue a safety risk alert. As a result, an audit of the aviation risk assessment program (IASA) will be conducted, and the country’s current Category 1 status will be reevaluated.
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During the interrogations, worrisome data came to light. Firstly, after the Miami accident, the Civil Aviation Junta (JAC) banned RED AIR, but shortly thereafter they were allowed to resume operations without implementing measures to improve operational safety. Additionally, the JAC and its U.S. counterpart (FAA) have minimal communication. Furthermore, the airline’s certification process was conducted without adhering to the relevant regulations.
From an operational perspective, it was revealed that RED AIR did not have the mandatory communication means on their aircraft as required. Instead, the aircraft used unauthorized satellite phones, which were also turned off. Despite being aware of this, the Dominican Institute of Civil Aviation allowed the airline to continue operating. It is also noteworthy that none of the officials sent to testify before the NTSB speak English proficiently, including the Director of Flight Standards. All IDAC officials required translators during the hearing.
On the other hand, RED AIR’s maintenance inspector at IDAC lacked knowledge about the day-to-day operations and had no idea whether the necessary maintenance was being performed. Similarly, the Director of Maintenance was unaware of the whereabouts of maintenance records, which were supposed to be under his supervision. Lastly, in violation of regulations, the aircraft’s maintenance log was not sealed after the accident.
