A report commissioned by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) from a committee of experts could be the final nail in the coffin of the Boeing 737 MAX 10 certification process. The report will undoubtedly influence the decision to grant a further extension in the certification for the largest variant of the MAX family.
Certification was key in Lion Air and Ethiopian crashes
The MITRE group’s report noted that «the exemption granted to the MAX family contributed to the two accidents (Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines) and influenced Boeing’s decision not to disclose information about the MCAS software, the root cause of the accidents». MITRE is a non-profit organization comprised of engineers from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) dedicated to producing reports for government agencies.
While its report was submitted to the government in March, it was only made public this week thanks to investigative work by Dominic Gates of the Seattle Times.
The FAA exempted the MAX family from modern crew information and alert system requirements. MITRE analysts concluded that if the FAA had insisted that the MAX meet modern crew alert standards, «the role of MCAS software in accidents could have been avoided.»
Upgrading the cockpit would have made MCAS safe
According to the report, «an upgrade to the crew alert system would have required pilots to receive additional training. Boeing would then have had no reason to conceal MCAS as it did.» Had this system been part of the training process, the report suggests that FAA engineers might well have pointed out its design flaws.
«Additional training would likely have removed Boeing’s incentive to limit disclosure of the MCAS system by making its existence part of the pilot training process. It is likely that MCAS’s reliance on a single angle-of-attack indicator would have been detected and corrected during certification,» the report states.
Between a rock and a hard place
If Boeing wants to certify the 737 MAX 10, it must do so before the end of the year -when the waiver deadline granted by Congress expires- or get a new extension. As the FAA has already indicated that «certification of the model is unlikely to be completed this year,» Boeing will probably have to resort to the second option, which is looking increasingly difficult. The extension can only be granted by Congress, and both the House and the Senate are increasingly reluctant to support the manufacturer.
If Congress does not grant a new extension, Boeing would have only two paths to follow with respect to the MAX 10. Either it cancels the program -a drastic and unlikely step since it has several hundred units on order- or it chooses to modify its cabin, making it different from that of the other MAXs.
This second path would require Boeing to invest around $750 million, and would further delay the model’s entry into service. It would also increase pilot training costs and create a logistical problem for operators, as the cockpits of the MAX family would not be uniform.
